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The Effect of Changes in Minimum Wage Rates 
on Provincial Unemployment Rates, 1970-77 
Dennis R. Maki 
This paper estimâtes the effect of différent minimum wage 
to average wage ratios among provinces on différences in pro-
vincial unemployment rates. The effect isfound to be statistical-
ly significant, but small in magnitude. 
The unemployment effects of minimum wages hâve been discussed in 
the économies literature for décades, a number of empirical studies using 
aggregate data hâve been conducted in the United States,1 and a number of 
studies utilizing employer questionnaires hâve been conducted in Canada2. 
To the author's knowledge, however, there hâve been no empirical studies 
in Canada directed to the question of how provincial minimum wage dif-
férences may hâve affected différences in provincial unemployment rates3. 
In part, this hiatus in published research may be due to the ambiguous 
nature of the theoretical prédiction regarding the unemployment effect of 
minimum wages. It may also be due in part to the fact that most previous 
studies in Canada hâve concluded that minimum wages hâve little, if any, 
* MAKI, Dennis R., Professor, Department of Economies and Commerce, Simon 
Fraser University, B.C. 
1 A récent example is by Jacob MINCER, ''Unemployment Effects of Minimum 
Wages", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 84, August 1976, pp. S87-104. Some comments 
on the relevance of this research for Canada are provided by E. G. WEST, "The Minimum 
Wage Debate - Some New Developments", The Labour Gazette, Vol. 77, March 1977, pp. 
106-108. 
2 Canadian and some United States studies are reviewed in BRITISH COLUMBIA 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, RESEARCH AND PLANNING BRANCH, "Minimum 
Wages: A Survey of Policy and Issues", Part I, Labour Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, December 
1974, pp. 15-25; and Part II, Labour Research Bulletin, Vol. 3, April 1975, pp. 17-33; 
AYKROYD, Colin, A Survey of Récent Canadian Minimum Wage Research, Victoria, 
Ministry of Labour, Province of British Columbia, 1977, 60 pp.; and CANADA, DEPART-
MENT OF LABOUR, "A Review of Major Empirical Studies of Minimum Wages", The 
Labour Gazette, Vol. 76, September 1976, pp. 489-92. 
3 MAPHANGOH, Steve, "Increased Minimum Wages Don't Necessarily Mean More 
Unemployment", The Labour Gazette, Vol. 76, September 1976, pp. 487-89 has investigated 
minimum wage effects in Canada using an aggregative model. 
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effect on unemployment; hence they could hardly affect provincial dif-
férences in unemployment rates. In any event, the current paper is devoted 
to analyzing this effect. The following section présents relevant theoretical 
considérations, with the remaining sections of the paper being devoted to 
obtaining an empirical estimate of the effect of interest. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
If one considers a partial equilibrium situation of only one neo-
classical labour market with an upward sloping supply curve and a 
downward sloping demand curve, the imposition of a minimum wage 
greater than the equilibrium wage will unambiguously cause unemploy-
ment. Demand falls relative to equilibrium employment and supply rises, 
and both effects lead to unemployment. If one considers a two sector model 
with a covered sector and an uncovered sector, the resuit is no longer unam-
biguous, since the excess supply in the covered sector resulting from an ef-
fective (above equilibrium) minimum wage can choose to work (presumably 
at sub-minimum wage rates) in the uncovered sector rather than opting for 
unemployment. The effect of the imposition of a minimum wage on 
unemployment in such a model dépends upon the relative efficiency of job 
search while unemployed to that while employed, the probabilities of ob-
taining employment in each of the sectors, the différence in wages (and 
other aspects of work) between the two sectors, and the absolute level of 
wages in the uncovered sector (if it is very low, leisure may be a preferred 
alternative). 
Even this two sector model ignores some gênerai equilibrium effects, 
however, since the effective minimum wage will increase the wages and pur-
chasing power of those who find employment paying that wage, and thus, 
depending upon the elasticities, may increase aggregate demand and 
employment. The effects of minimum wages in gênerai equilibrium models 
hâve been investigated by H. Johnson4 and more recently by E. Tower5. 
Johnson showed, using a two-good model, that if a minimum wage law is 
passed applying only to the capital-intensive sector, there exist combina-
tions of the elasticity of substitution and elasticities of demand for the two 
goods where labour in both sectors can be better off after the minimum 
4 JOHNSON, Harry G., "Minimum Wage Laws: A General Equilibrium Analysis", 
Canadian Journal of Economies, Vol. 2, November 1969, pp. 599-604. 
5 TOWER, Edward, "The Ambiguous Effect of Minimum Wages and Unions on 
Employment When Labor Need Not Be Unemployed to Search for a Better Job" , Duke 
University, December 1977, mimeo. 
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wage than before. On the other hand, if the minimum wage is universal or is 
applied to ail sectors except those regarded as constituting a "subsistence 
sector", the "traditional conclusion can be rigorously demonstrated",6 i.e. 
the minimum wage causes some persons to become unemployed and/or to 
work at lower wages in the "subsistance sector". Tower's contribution was 
to analyze the unemployment effect of minimum wages in a context where 
workers may search for work while employed, so that ail unemployment 
consists of the voluntary substitution of leisure for work, using a gênerai 
equilibrium framework. He found that aggregate employment could rise or 
fall when a minimum wage is applied to one sector, depending upon the 
assumptions made. Indeed, he found that there is not even a 
"presumption" about how aggregate employment will change with the in-
troduction of a minimum wage. He did find, "that aggregate employment 
will necessarily fall is a fortiori true if we replace a binding minimum wage 
with a sufficiently large one..."7. 
Thus, the theoretically expected effect of minimum wages on 
unemployment is strictly speaking indeterminate, though in a country such 
as Canada where coverage is extensive in ail jurisdictions, job search is pro-
bably more efficient while unemployed than while employed, and minimum 
wage levels are effective in a large number of jobs, there is at least a 
"presumption", in Tower's terms, that an increase in minimum wages 
would lead to some unemployment. Whether the magnitude of such 
unemployment is substantial enough to be measureable is essentially an em-
pirical question. 
The theory, as reviewed thus far, does not suggest the form of the em-
pirical model which should be used to attempt to measure the effect of in-
terest. Mincer has argued strongly that there is a "substantive distinction 
between minimum-wage effects on employment and those on unemploy-
ment", and concluded on the basis of his empirical work for the United 
States that "no more than a third of the employment loss in the covered sec-
tor appears as unemployment, while the bulk withdraws from the labor 
force"8. The implication is that if one wishes to fully understand the effects 
of minimum wages on labour markets one should obtain the dernand and 
supply effects separately, and compute the unemployment effects from 
thèse9. However, such "full understanding" is not one of the goals of this 
6 JOHNSON, Op. Cit., p. 599. 
7 TOWER, Op. Cit., p. 12. 
8 MINCER, Op. Cit., pp. S87-8. 
9 MAPHANGOH, Op. Cit., also uses a two équation approach to estimate the overall 
effect of minimum wages. 
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paper, interest résides solely in provincial différences in unemployment 
rates. Using the principle of Occam's razor, a simpler, reduced-form, model 
is employed. 
Figure 1 
Wage 
W HW 
W M = W E 
W^ 
W, 
Employment 
The main assumptions of this model can be illustrated with référence to 
Figure 1. It is assumed there are three sectors in the economy, employing a 
given homogeneous type of labour; (i) a high wage sectôr with demand 
curve Djj\y, where because of the actions of trade unions or other causes 
(such as above market wages for government employées due to an absence 
of régional wage discrimination) wages are so high that minimum wages are 
not effective, (ii) a "subsistence" sector, uncovered by minimum wage 
législation, with demand curve Dg, and (iii) a"covered" sector, where the 
minimum wage is effective, with demand curve DQ. For simplicity, the 
three demand curves are drawn parallel,10 and D j is the horizontal summa-
tion of thèse three curves, or total labour demand. The Sj7 curve is the effec-
tive supply curve of labour, representing the amount of labour willing and 
able to work in available jobs at différent wage rates; and the S^ curve is 
io The relative placement of the three demand curves along the horizontal axis is ar-
bitrary and does not affect the discussion. MINCER, Op. Cit., discusses the effects of differ-
ing demand elasticities in a two-sector (covered and non-covered) model. 
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the apparent supply curve of labour, representing effective supply plus 
voluntary unemployment due to job search activity11. If this labour market, 
including ail three sub-sectors, was fully compétitive, the equilibrium wage 
rate would be Wg and total employment would be Ey. The imposition of 
an above-equilibrium wage Wpj^ y in the high wage sector would decrease 
employment in that sector to Ej. If labour supply were totally wage-
inelastic, the wage in the subsistence and covered sectors would fall to W Q , 
where (WE - W Q ) = 1/2 (W H W - WE), and employment in the two 
sectors would rise to E2 and E5, respectively. In this case, the sum of Ej, E2 
and E5 would still equal E-j;. Finally, assume a minimum wage of Wj^ j is ap-
plied to the covered sector12. This will cause employment in the covered sec-
tor to fall to E4 and employment in the subsistence sector to rise to E3, with 
a fall in subsistence sector wages to Wg, where 
(WE - W Q ) = ( W Q -Wg), still assuming completely wage-inelastic 
labour supply. In this circumstance, the sum of Ej, E3 and E4 still equals 
E-j;. 
If there is some wage elasticity to the supply of labour schedule, as 
shown by the upward sloping SE and S^ curves in Figure 1, the com-
parative statics change as follows. Some of the workers displaced by the im-
position of Wj^w in the high wage sector might opt for unemployment and 
job search rather than accepting jobs in the other two sectors, causing the 
wage in thèse sectors to fall by less than (WE - W Q ) and total employment 
to be less than E j . Some additional workers who where not part of the 
labour force when the maximum wage available was WE may also be induc-
ed to join the labour force to search for jobs in the high wage sector, further 
increasing unemployment. The minimum wage imposition has similar 
results. Some of the workers displaced from the covered sector may opt for 
unemployment and job search rather than accepting jobs in the subsistence 
sector, causing wages in the latter to fall by less than (WQ - Ws), and total 
employment to fall still further. 
Two points relevant for empirical work émerge from this analysis. 
First, the effect of the minimum wage on unemployment dépends upon the 
relation between the minimum wage and the entire structure of wages. The 
number of persons displaced from the covered sector by the imposition of 
11 The distinction is similar to that made by Melvin REDER, "The Theory of Frictional 
Unemployment", Economica, Vol. 36, February 1969, pp. 1-28. See also Z. A. SPINDLER 
and Dennis R. MAKI, "More on the Effects of Unemployment Compensation on the Rate of 
Unemployment in Great Britain", Simon Fraser University, April 1978, mimeo. 
12 WJ^J is shown in Figure 1 as equal to Wg to avoid cluttering the graph. The effect is as 
discussed as long as W Q < WM < W J J W . 
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W M who choose unemployment and search dépends upon W J J ^ a s wen* a s 
W§. In the absence of more detailed information about the structure of 
wages, the ratio of minimum to average wages seems a reasonable way to 
capture this dependence in an empirical model. The second point is that 
none of the comparative static effects noted above involve shifting of the Sg 
or S^ curves; rather, what is involved is movements along thèse curves. 
Hence, since recorded unemployment is given by the horizontal distance 
between the D j and S A curves (a fuzzy concept in a labour "market"13 
where multiple wage rates are obtained, one should include shift variables 
for SE and S^, and for S A relative to Sg, in the empirical model if such 
shifts are thought to hâve occurred. 
The model specified in the following section includes variables to ac-
count for shifts in'demand, shifts in supply, and shifts in apparent supply 
relative to effective supply. It does not contain any variable to account for 
the influence of unions or other non-competitive éléments which maintain 
wages in some subsector above the equilibrium level, an effect suggested by 
H. Grubel14 as being potentially important. It is not clear what would be an 
appropriate variable to pick up this effect, but the analysis of the simple 
model associated with Figure 1 suggests it should be largely independent of 
and additive to the effect of minimum wages. Hence omission of a variable 
measuring the influence of unions and other non-competitive éléments 
should not seriously bias estimation of the minimum wage effect. Finding 
an appropriate variable or variables is a potentially interesting topic for 
future research. 
THE MODEL, VARIABLES AND DATA 
The model utilized is a pooled cross-section time séries approach, using 
ten cross-sectional observations by province and eight time séries observa-
tions covering the period 1970-77. Unemployment rates for Prince Edward 
Island hâve only been published since 1975, so there are a total of 75 obser-
vations available for estimation. The period covered by the time séries was 
dictated by a désire to use the most current data available, and the fact that 
Statistics Canada has provided adjusted Labour Force Survey data (ad-
justed to current définitions) only back to 1970. 
13 The word market is in quotes because a common définition of a market requires that a 
single price obtain. The construct depicted in Figure 1 is a "market" only in the sensé of having 
a single supply schedule. 
14 GRUBEL, Herbert G., "Whither the Natural Rate of Unemployment?", Simon 
Fraser University, April 1978, mimeo. 
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The spécification of the model is a reduced form équation using the 
natural logarithm of the unemployment rate as the dépendent variable, 
foliowing the formulation in Grubel, Maki and Sax15. Cyclical variations in 
unemployment are assumed to be captured by the percentage change in the 
employment index (équivalent to the percentage change in employment), 
which also captures secular demand-side différences between provinces. 
Variables are included measuring the effects of the unemployment in-
surance program, since thèse hâve previously been argued to affect inter-
provincial unemployment rate différences16. The aggregate labour force 
participation rate is included as a proxy for secular supply side effects and 
to capture différences between provinces in supply behaviour. The effect of 
interest, the minimum wage effect, is captured by the ratio of minimum 
wages to average wages, as suggested by the theoretical arguments in the 
preceding section. Finally, dummy variables are included for each province, 
capturing whatever other interprovincial différences in unemployment rates 
hâve remained constant over the time period considered. Thèse dummy 
variables also alleviate heteroscedasticity problems. The précise définitions 
of the mnemonic variable labels used, data sources, and adjustments made 
to the data are relegated to an appendix. 
Estimation was performed using ordinary least squares on the single 
équation, despite the fact that a reasonable argument could be made that 
some of the explanatory variables are really endogenous. The labour force 
participation rate (LFPR), in particular, has long been argued to be a func-
tion of the unemployment rate, although no clear consensus has emerged on 
the sign of the partial derivative. Further, a comparison of the OLS and 
2SLS results in Grubel, Maki and Sax17 discloses that the coefficients of the 
LFPR terms in the unemployment équation are biased in OLS estimation. 
The same results disclose, however, that the coefficients of other variables 
in the-équation (excluding the intercept) are essentially unaffected by this 
bias. On the basis of this évidence, and the fact that the simple corrélation 
between the minimum wage to average wage ratio and LFPR is low 
(r = .10), it is argued that OLS yields reasonable estimâtes of ail 
parameters except the coefficient of LFPR in the current estimation. 
Although results are computed in Table 1 for the effects of LFPR dif-
férences, thèse should not be viewed as reliable estimâtes. 
15 GRUBEL, H. G., MAKI, D., and S. SAX, "Real and Insurance-Induced Unemploy-
ment in Canada", Canadian Journal of Economies, Vol. 8, May 1975, pp. 174-91. 
16 Ibid. 
î? Ibid., p. 183. 
THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN MINIMUM WAGES RATES 425 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The estimated équation (t values in parenthèses) is: 
Ln URATE -
0.583 UCB/AWW + 0.012 MW/AWW - 0.023 PCEI - 0.017 PCEI.j 
(1.94) (2.10) (-4.84) (-3.83) 
-0.006 DSQLR + 0.080 LFPR -1.958 NFLD -3.110 PEI 
(-6.47) (6.93) (-4.14) (-5.48) 
-2.912 NS - 2.644 NB - 3.091 QUE - 3.759 ONT 
(-5.44) (-5.09) (-5.43) (-6.02) 
-3.667 MAN - 3.663 SASK - 3.783 ALTA - 3.132 BC 
(-6.22) (-6.42) (-5.92) (-5.21) ( 1 ) 
R2 = 0.94 
It should be noted that the high R2 is due in large part to the nature of 
pooled cross-section time séries data, a point which can be illustrated by 
noting that regressing Ln URATE on only the ten dummy variables would 
yield an R2 of 0.74. The coefficients of ail six non-dummy variables are 
statistically significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test. The coefficients of 
the dummy variables hâve no useful interprétation. They represent the value 
of Ln URATE if ail other variables in the équation (including LFPR) are 
zéro, and hence exponentiating the coefficients of the dummies should yield 
values very close to zéro. In fact, ail of the coefficients are strongly 
statistically différent from zéro, but the largest value, for Newfoundland, 
represents an unemployment rate of only 0.1 per cent. 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
The elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to MW/AWW, 
measured at the mean of the latter (46.5 per cent) is 0.56. The magnitude of 
the estimated effect can be illustrated with hypothetical numbers. If some 
province with a minimum wage of $3.00 per hour and average weekly wages 
of $250 and an unemployment rate of 8 per cent were to increase its 
minimum wage to $3.50, ceteris paribus, its unemployment rate would in-
crease to 8.7 per cent. 
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Since the ratio of minimum to average wages displays considérable 
time séries variation within provinces due to the discrète nature of minimum 
wage level changes, any comparisons of minimum wage effects between 
provinces should be done using averages over some time period. Given the 
short time period analyzed in this paper, the only analysis presented consists 
of Computing the différence in the unemployment rate averaged over the 8 
year period which would hâve resulted if the average minimum to average 
wage ratio for the province had been equal to the average minimum to 
average wage ratio in the entire sample. Results are presented in Table 1, 
and the means of calculation noted in the source information of that table. 
Table 1 
Changes in Average Unemployment Rate for 1970-77 if Value 
of Variable for Province had been at Mean for Entire Sample 
Province LFPR MW/AWW UCB/A WW DSQIR PCEI PCEILAG 
Newfoundland 13.4 0.6 0.2 -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 
Prince Edward 
Island 1.5 -0.8 -0.3 -1.6 -0.1 -0.3 
Nova Scotia 2.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 
New Brunswick 4.5 
- -
-0.9 -0.1 
-
Québec 0.1 
- -
-0.4 -0.2 -0.1 
Ontario -1.8 0.2 
-
0.1 
- -
Manitoba -1.0 -0.2 
-
0.6 -0.1 -0.1 
Saskatchewan -0.2 -0.2 
-
0.3 0.1 
-
Alberta -2.1 0.1 
-
1.1 0.3 0.2 
British 
Columbia -1.4 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 
Source: Computed as U: - IL, where Ln(U:) = Ln (IL) + bj (Xj - XJ:) , and Uj is the mean of 
the unemployment rates for province j over the period 1970-77, the bj are the coeffi-
cients for variable i from équation 1, Xj is the mean for variable i over the 75 observa-
tions in the sample, and Xjj is the mean for variable i for province j over the period 
1970-77. Since unemployment rates for P.E.I. were only available for 1975-77, ail 
means for this province (including Xj) were computed over this period only. 
Notes: A " - " in the table indicates the value is less than 0.05 in absolute value. 
Confining attention to the MW/AWW variable, it is noted that British 
Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Newfoundland would hâve had somewhat 
high unemployment rates if they had average minimum to average wage 
ratios, with the reverse for Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan. In no province does the différence reach one percentage 
point, indeed the Prince Edward Island estimate is suspect since it is based 
on only three data points, and the largest différence for the other nine pro-
vinces is only 0.6 percentage points. 
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Turning briefly to the other variables in the équation, the elasticity of 
the unemployment rate with respect to UCB/AWW is only 0.23, evaluated 
at the mean of the latter (0.399), which is considerably lower than the 
elasticity estimate of 0.94 previously obtained18. It is also noted from Table 
1 that the benefit-wage ratio does not explain much of the interprovincial 
différences observed in unemployment rates. The disqualification rate for 
unemployment benefits appears to be a much mOre powerful variable in ex-
plaining unemployment rate différences. No explanation is provided hère 
for the différences in estimated elasticities of UCB/AWW between the cur-
rent and previous studies, except to note that the resuit is apparently not due 
to the considération of minimum wages. The coefficient of UCB/AWW is 
virtually unaffected if MW/AWW is removed from the équation. The 
employment change terms indicate, as expected, that unemployment rates 
in Alberta and British Columbia are lower than they would be if thèse pro-
vinces had experienced only average employment growth, with the reverse 
for the Atlantic provinces. The maximum differential, between Alberta and 
Prince Edward Island, is still slightly less than one percentage point. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Différences between minimum to average wage ratios among provinces 
were found to be statistically significant déterminants of différences in pro-
vincial unemployment rates. The absolute magnitudes of the effects 
estimated are not very large, but they are still larger than found in previous 
studies for Canada19. The preliminary findings presented hère suggest the 
impact of minimum wages on unemployment may be non-negligible. 
18 Ibid. 
19 MAPHANGOH, Op. Cit., estimated that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage 
would decrease total employment by 0.1 per cent. The estimâtes herein would imply a change 
of about four times that, though the results are not directly comparable due to considération of 
supply effects. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Définitions and Data Sources 
URATE -The aggregate unemployment rate for the province. Data for 1970-75 
from Statistics Canada, "The Labour Force, Historical Séries, An-
nual Averages, 1970-75" (mimeo); 1976 from Statistics Canada, 
71-001, December, 1976; 1977 from Statistics Canada, 71-001, 
December, 1977. 
UCB -Average unemployment compensation benefits per week. Data for 
1970 from Statistics Canada, 73-001, January, 1971; 1971-72 from 
Statistics Canada, 73-001, December, 1972; 1973-74 from Statistics 
Canada, 73-001, December, 1974, 1975-76 from Statistics Canada, 
73-001, December, 1976; 1977, January - September year-to-date 
average, computed from Statistics Canada, 73-001, various 1977 
issues. 
AWW -Average weekly wages and salaries for the industrial composite. Data 
for 1970 from Statistics Canada, 11-505; 1971-72 from Statistics 
Canada, 11-003, March, 1974; 1973 from Statistics Canada, 11-003, 
July, 1975; 1974-75 from Statistics Canada, 11-003, December, 1975, 
1976-77 from Statistics Canada, 11-003, December, 1977 (1977 figure 
is for July, not annual average). 
-The ratio of minimum to average wages. Data for 1970-76 provided 
by Mr. Colin Aykroyd, Research Officer, Research and Planning 
Branch, British Columbia Department of Labour (mimeo). Data 
represent a weighted average of the gênerai minimum wage rates in 
effect in a given year, multiplied by 40 hours per week, expressed as a 
percentage of AWW. 1977 figures calculated by author in the same 
manner. 
-Percentage change (year-over-year) in the employment index. Data 
on employment index from: 1970, Statistics Canada, 11-505; 
1971-72, Statistics Canada, 11-003, December, 1973; 1973-74, 
Statistics Canada, 11-003, December, 1975; 1975-77, Statistics 
Canada, 11-003, December, 1977. (1977 figure is seasonally adjusted 
figure for September, 1977, not annual average). PCEI_| is PCEI 
lagged one year. 
DSQLR -A disqualification rate for unemployment insurance benefits, 
calculated as disqualifications and disentitlements per 1,000 weeks 
compensated. Data on disqualifications and disentitlements from 
Statistics Canada, 73-001, various monthly issues (1977 figures are 
January - September totals). Weeks compensated calculated as total 
benefit payments divided by UCB. Data on total benefit payments 
for 1970-76 from Statistics Canada, 73-001, December, 1976; for 
1977 from Statistics Canada, 73-001, various 1977 issues (1977 
figures are January - September totals). 
MW/AWW 
PCEI 
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LFPR -The aggregate labour force participation rate for the province. Data 
for 1970-75 from Statistics Canada, " T h e Labour Force, Historical 
Séries, Annual Averages, 1970-75" (mimeo); 1976 from Statistics 
Canada , 71-001, December, 1976; 1977 from Statistics Canada , 
71-001, December, 1977. 
N F L D , PEI , NS, NB, Q U E , O N T , M A N , SASK, A L T A , BC - dummy variables 
taking the value of unity for ail years for the province in question, 
and zéro otherwise. 
Ail variables are measured province and time period spécifie. 
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Les effets des modifications du salaire minimum 
sur les taux de chômage provinciaux 
Cet article présente les résultats d'une tentative en vue de déterminer dans quelle 
mesure les différences dans les taux de chômage provinciaux sont attribuables aux 
différences du taux du salaire minimum par rapport aux taux moyens des salaires. 
Les opinions relatives à l'effet théorique du salaire minimal y sont revisées, en notant 
que la conclusion de théories générales sophistiquées d'équilibre est que l'effet ap-
paraît indéterminé, c'est-à-dire qu'il s'agit d'une question empirique. L'auteur 
présente un modèle d'équilibre plus simple et partiel comme un guide pour en arriver 
à une équation estimative en vue de mesurer cet effet. 
On y établit l'estimation au moyen d'un projet regroupé (par province) de 
données tirées des séries chronologiques (observations annuelles de 1970' à 1977) 
pour mettre au point une équation où le logarythme du taux de chômage est régressé 
sur le rapport entre le salaire minimal et la moyenne des gains, le rapport entre les 
prestations d'assurance-chômage et le taux des salaires moyens, sur le taux de dis-
qualification aux prestations d'assurance-chômage, sur le pourcentage des 
changements dans l'indice d'emploi, cette variable étant reculée d'un an, sur le taux 
de participation et d'autres variables propres à chacune des provinces (cela, afin de 
cerner toutes les autres causes de variation dans les taux de chômage parmi les pro-
vinces, causes demeurées constantes au cours de la période étudiée). 
Tous les coefficients sont significatifs considérés d'un point de vue statistique 
suivant les mesures ordinaires, l'élasticité du taux de chômage en regard du rapport 
entre le tarif minimal et les gains moyens s'établissant à 0.56. 
Des calculs furent ensuite effectués pour calculer le taux de chômage pendant la 
période 1970-1977, calculs qui auraient été obtenus pour chaque province selon 
l'hypothèse que dans chaque province les valeurs nationales moyennes des 
différentes variables indépendantes étaient identiques. Les résultats de cet exercice 
ont indiqué que, à l'île du Prince-Edouard, en Nouvelle-Ecosse, au Manitoba et en 
Saskatchewan, les taux de chômage auraient été moindres que les valeurs réelles. 
Tandis qu'à Terre-Neuve, en Ontario, en Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique, ils 
auraient été plus élevés. Quant au Québec et au Nouveau-Brunswick, la différence 
n'a dépassé 0.8 de point et elle excédait 0.5 dans deux provinces seulement. 
La conclusion qui se dégage de cette étude, c'est que le tarif du salaire minimal 
affecte les taux de chômage, mais que l'ampleur de cet effet n'est pas marquée. 
